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Abstract
For an even number of firms with identical transport cost, spatial Cournot competition in a
circular city generates a continuum of equilibria. We establish that any transport cost
differential between the firms, however small, may eliminate all the equilibria, except the
partial agglomeration equilibrium pattern characterized in Matsushima (2001).
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Since Pal (1998), spatial Cournot competition along a circular mar-
ket has gained increasing attention.
1 In recent years, there have been a
number of applications with Cournot competition in a circular city. (See
for example, Matsumura (2003), Matsushima and Matsumura (2003),
Nariu and Flath (2004)). Although spatial Cournot competition has
attractive and useful properties, it is known to have multiple equilib-
ria, which impedes the applicability of this framework. The objective
of this work is to ￿nd reasonable criteria that resolve the multiplicity
of equilibria.
Matsushima (2001) is the ￿rst to demonstrate the multiple equilibria
by establishing an equilibrium, which is qualitatively di⁄erent from
the equidistant equilibrium location pattern as characterized in Pal
(1998).
2 He establishes that half of the ￿rms agglomerating at one
point and the other half agglomerating at the diametrically opposite
point, can also be sustained as an equilibrium location pattern (partial
agglomeration).
3 In recent work, Gupta et al (2004) show that there is
a continuum of equilibria, such that with n = 2m (m ￿ 1) ￿rms, if they
locate at opposite ends of any set of m diameters of the circle, then
the locations are sustainable as SPNE locations. Hence, the equilibria
characterized by Pal and Matsushima are in fact special cases of the
set of in￿nitely many equilibria.
Observe that the equilibrium locations discussed in all the aforemen-
tioned work are derived with the assumption of identical transport costs
across ￿rms. Indeed this is a standard assumption in this literature.
One might argue that transport cost di⁄erentials across ￿rms will not
qualitatively change the equilibrium and are hence of minimal interest.
This work will show that this is actually far from the truth. We allow
￿rms to have di⁄erent transport costs, and demonstrate that this leads
to qualitatively di⁄erent equilibrium location patterns. In fact, this
paper will show that of the in￿nitely many equilibria along opposite
ends of any m diameters of the circle, only the partial agglomeration
equilibrium in Matsushima (2001) is robust to non-identical transport
costs.
1See Anderson and Neven (1991) and Hamilton, Thisse and Weskamp (1989) for
spatial Cournot competition in Hotelling￿ s (1929) linear city.
2Pal (1998) shows that the ￿rms locates equidistantly along the perimeter of the
circular city.
3This result holds for an even number of ￿rms. When the number of ￿rms is




We consider a spatial Cournot oligopoly serving a circular market
with perimeter one. The consumers are distributed uniformly on the
circle. The market demand at each point x on the circle is given by
p(x) = a ￿ bQ(x), where a;b > 0 are constants and independent of x.
Q(x) is the aggregate quantity supplied and p(x) is the market price
at x. There are n = 2m (m ￿ 1) ￿rms who choose their locations on
the circle. For simplicity, we assume m = 2. We conjecture, however,
that the results hold qualitatively for all m. The points on the circle
are identi￿ed with numbers in [0;1], the north most point being 0 and
the values increasing in a clockwise direction. Thus, the north most
point is considered both 0 and 1. The vector ￿ = (￿1;￿2;￿3;￿4) denotes
the locations of the 4 ￿rms and the vector ￿
￿i = (￿j;￿k;￿l) denotes
the location of all ￿rms except i (1 ￿ i ￿ 4). The ￿rms produce and
sell a homogeneous output that they deliver to consumers. Arbitrage
among consumers is assumed to be infeasible, enabling the ￿rms to
discriminate across consumers. The ￿rms have identical production
technology, with constant marginal and average cost (both normalized
to zero). The transportation technologies, however, may di⁄er among
￿rms. Let ti > 0, be the linear transport cost per unit distance for ￿rm
i (1 ￿ i ￿ 4): The good can be transported only along the perimeter
of the circle. Each ￿rm serves a market point x incurring the lowest
possible transport cost. We also assume that a ￿ 2max[t1;t2;t3;t4].
This condition ensures that all ￿rms will always serve the entire market.
We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of a two-stage
game, where ￿rms choose their locations in stage one and compete in
quantities in stage two.
3. Properties of a location equilibrium
Notation 1. ci (x) = min[ti j￿i ￿ xj;ti(1￿ j￿i ￿ xj)] denotes Firm i￿ s
(1 ￿ i ￿ 4) delivered marginal cost at x.
Notation 2. Let b ￿ be the point diametrically opposite ￿. Then L(￿)
denotes the half circle from ￿ to b ￿ (not including b ￿) in the clockwise
direction and R(￿) denotes the half circle from ￿ to b ￿ (not including ￿)
in the counter-clockwise direction.
De￿nition 1. Competitors￿aggregate cost median: ￿ is a competitors￿
aggregate cost median for Firm i if and only if the aggregate delivered
marginal cost of all other ￿rms in L(￿) equals the aggregate delivered3














Proposition 1. At SPNE locations, each ￿rm maximizes its pro￿t only
if it locates at its competitors￿aggregate cost median.
Proof. See proof of Proposition 1 in Gupta et al. (2004). They present
the proof for identical transport cost. The result, however, holds for
non-identical transport cost and the proof is similar. ￿
The search for SPNE locations, therefore, can be con￿ned to a set of
locations such that each ￿rm locates at its competitors￿aggregate cost
median. If there are multiple vectors that satisfy the competitors￿cost
median property for each ￿rm, the second order condition can be used
to eliminate vectors that satisfy the competitors￿aggregate cost median
property, but are not a pro￿t maximizing location for each ￿rm, given
the locations of the others. It can be checked that the second order
condition requires
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4. The SPNE locations
Proposition 2. (Gupta et al, 2004) Suppose that t1 = t2 = t3 = t4;
and n = 2m (m ￿ 1). If the ￿rms locate at opposite ends of any set
of m diameters of the circle, then the ￿rm locations are sustainable as
SPNE locations.
The above proposition holds for identical transport cost for all ￿rms
and results in a continuum of equilibria. However, we will establish that
this result is critically dependent on identical transport costs. To do
so, consider a marginal adjustment in the transport cost assumption,
such that ￿rms 1, 2, and 3 have identical transport cost t , while ￿rm
4￿ s transport cost is t + "; where " > 0:
Proposition 3. If t1 = t2 = t3 = t, but t4 = t + ";" > 0; then the
equilibrium locations described in Proposition 2 cannot be sustained as
SPNE locations, except when the ￿rms agglomerate at the opposite ends
of the same diameter.
Proof. Let ￿rms 3 and 4 locate at 0 and 1
2 respectively and let ￿rm 2
locate at ￿ < 1
2. It can be checked that ￿rm 1 will not locate at the
opposite end of the diameter, across from ￿rm 2, at 1 ￿ ￿, since its
￿rst order condition given by the competitor0s aggregate cost median
(Proposition 1), is violated. It can be checked that the competitors￿
aggregate cost median property is satis￿ed if the ￿rms locate at the4
opposite ends of a diameter, with at least one ￿rm at each end point.
￿
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. Suppose that there














respectively. To satisfy the competitor￿ s aggregate cost
median, the ine¢ cient ￿rm (￿rm 4) must be located at one end of the
diameter passing through ￿a; because otherwise the pair of ￿rms 3 and
4 distort the symmetry of the aggregate costs.
Proposition 4. Suppose t1 = t2 = t3 = t, but t4 = t + ";" > 0: (i)
Two ￿rms located at 0 and two ￿rms located at 1
2 can be sustained as
SPNE locations if and only if t ￿ ". (ii) Firms 1, 2, 3 located 0 and
￿rm 4 located at 1
2 can be sustained as SPNE locations if and only if
t ￿ ".
Proof. First note that the locations satisfy the competitors￿cost me-
dian property (Proposition 1) by symmetry. The rest of the proof
follows from the second order conditions (
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Without loss of generality, let ￿rms 1 and 2 locate at 0 and let ￿rm 4
locate at 1
2: Now consider ￿rm 3. The aggregate competitors￿cost at
0 equals 1
2t4 while at 1
2 it equals 1
2(t1 + t2) = 1
2(2t): For t4 > 2t, ￿rm 3
will locate at 0, whereas for t4 < 2t, ￿rm 3 will locate at 1
2. ￿
Proposition 3 establishes that the result with in￿nitely many equilib-
ria characterized in Gupta et al (2004) is sensitive to identical transport
costs for all ￿rms. For any nonidentical transport cost, however small
the di⁄erence, the result may no longer hold. Only an equilibrium
where the ￿rms cluster at opposite ends of one diameter, as charac-
terized in Matsushima (2001), remains robust to the assumption of
nonidentical transport costs. However, we show that there does not
have to be an equal number of ￿rms at opposite ends of the diameter.
If the transport cost di⁄erential is large enough, the least e¢ cient ￿rm
is located by itself at one end of the diameter. This result that all the
other ￿rms cluster and do so away from the least e¢ cient ￿rm is quite
counter-intuitive, as one might (incorrectly) imagine that locating close
to the ine¢ cient ￿rm would be advantageous.4
4It is also interesting to note that a di⁄erent pattern of location equilibrium may
exist where the least e¢ cient ￿rm with transport cost t + " locates at 0 and the
other three ￿rms locate at 1
2;￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ where 1
2 > ￿ > 1
4: That is, the three
e¢ cient ￿rms may not cluster at one market point but will all locate along one half
of the market perimeter.5
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper addresses the issue of in￿nitely many equilibria associated
with spatial Cournot competition in a circular city. We show that
this result is sensitive to identical transport cost across all ￿rms. If
transport cost di⁄erentials are allowed, it is no longer valid. In fact,
the only part of the original result to survive is that ￿rms cluster (not
necessarily in equal numbers) at opposite ends of a single diameter.
This work makes the point that di⁄erent transport cost across ￿rms is
not a non trivial issue and it qualitatively changes our understanding
of the location patterns with Cournot competition in a circular city.
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